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Can You Really Have Too Much of a Good Thing?:
How Benevolent Tax Policies Have Attributed to the
Explosion of Health Care Costs and How New
Policies Threaten to Do More of the Same
J. Paul Singleton*
I. INTRODUCTION
While the United States health care market has been the benefactor
of numerous innovations that have significantly increased the quality
of American health care services over the last century, it has also been
plagued with ever-increasing health care costs that have consistently
outpaced inflation. Rapidly rising costs have led to stagnating take-
home wages, fear of devastating budget deficits, and increasing num-
bers of uninsured. In this context, the ability of the free market to
combat the rising cost of health care has been called into doubt. Ac-
cordingly, both the President and Congress have engaged in a massive
health care reform campaign that is predicted to have significant im-
pacts on the health and welfare of the American people.
In a highly publicized Christmas Eve vote, the Senate recently
passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,' which has
now been signed into law. This bill seeks to address problems of ac-
cessibility by requiring most Americans to purchase, and employers to
provide, qualified health insurance by imposing a tax on individuals
without such coverage and employers who refuse to offer coverage.2
To increase affordability, the bill also provides generous tax credits to
families for the purchase of insurance3 and significantly expands
* B.S., summa cum laude, University of Kentucky (2007); J.D., summa cum laude, University
of Tennessee (2010). Paul Singleton is an associate with Manier & Herod, PC of Nashville,
Tennessee practicing in the areas of taxation, estate planning, and business planning. Special
thanks go out to University of Tennessee Distinguished Professor of Law Amy M. Hess for her
gracious comments and assistance on earlier drafts of this paper.
1. Patient Protection & Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
2. Id. §§ 1501, 1513 (adding Chapter 48 to the Internal Revenue Code to provide tax penalties
for the failure of individuals to obtain coverage and amending Chapter 46 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code to provide tax penalties for employers to fail to offer coverage to employees who
receive tax credits for the purchase of insurance on the individual market).
3. Id. at § 1401 (providing refundable tax credits to families making up to four hundred per-
cent of the federal poverty line by adding Section 36B to Chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue
Code).
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Medicaid eligibility in order to cover a greater share of America's low-
income population.'
Despite the magnitude of America's current health care problem
and various government officials' persistent pleas for reform, a con-
sensus on the appropriate solution to America's problem of rising
health care costs and decreasing accessibility has yet to be reached.5
This article will engage in an economic analysis of the troubles facing
the American health care market and the recent solution proposed by
the federal government to address these problems. First, this article
will outline how a perverse tax structure has led to grossly distorted
incentives for health care consumers, how these incentives have cre-
ated market inefficiencies that contribute to health care costs that
consistently exceed inflation, and how these inefficiencies may lead to
a justification of government intervention. Next, the Patient Protec-
tion and Affordable Care Act will be examined in relation to how well
it addresses market failures or, in the alternative, whether it results in
even more inefficiency. Lastly, within the context of current health
reform solutions, suggestions will be offered that may help to better
tailor future amendments to the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act in order to more efficiently address the true barrier to in-
creasing the accessibility of health care, America's dramatically rising
health care costs.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE INEFFICIENCIES PLAGUING THE U.S.
HEALTH CARE MARKET
In theory, a free market is a very utilitarian idea. It is supposed to
produce goods and services desired by society at quantities and costs
that maximize the benefit to both consumers and suppliers, maximiz-
ing the utility of society.6 In other words, a free market creates incen-
tives that allocate resources in the most socially beneficial way.
However, it is hard to argue that the United States health care market
allocates resources in a way that maximizes the utility of its citizens.
4. Id. at § 2001 (expanding Medicaid to one hundred thirty-three percent of the federal pov-
erty line by amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)).
5. Frank Newport, Americans Tilt Against Democrats' Plans if Summit Fails, GALLUP (Feb. 25,
2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/126191/Americans-Tilt-Against-Democrats-Plans-Summit-
Fails.aspx (showing that "Americans by a [forty-nine] to [forty-two percent] margin oppose
rather than favor" the current health proposals); see also Jeffrey M. Jones, In U.S., 45% Favor,
48% Oppose Obama Health Care Plan, GALLUP (Mar. 9, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/
126521/Favor-Oppose-Obama-Health care-Plan.aspx (showing that by Mar. 9, 2010, the numbers
had shifted to forty-five percent of Americans favoring the President's health care plan and
forty-eight percent opposing).
6. N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMIcs 75 (4th ed. 2007).
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In particular, the U.S. health care market is plagued with dramatically
rising costs that prevent a significant number of the American popula-
tion from being able to access adequate care needed for basic survival,
creates great strain on federal and state budgets attempting to provide
this care, and puts domestic businesses that provide health care for
employees at a significant competitive disadvantage compared to
global businesses operating in localities with lower health care costs.
For instance, between 1999 and 2008, health insurance premiums
increased one hundred nineteen percent, while inflation stood at only
twenty-nine percent.7 For the average family with income below the
poverty line, these increased costs led to health care spending that
reached nearly thirty percent of after-tax income.8 The impacts of
these costs are overwhelming to American families. A 2005 study
conducted by the Employee Benefit Research Institute found that
nearly twenty-five percent of all Americans have "had difficulty pay-
ing for basic necessities, like food, heat, and housing" due to rising
health care costs.9 Partly because of these rising costs, as many as 45.7
million Americans did not have health insurance as of 2007.10
While the consequences of dramatically increasing costs for the
poor may be intuitive," its affect on the rest of the economy requires
a more reasoned analysis. Specifically, the uninsured have tradition-
ally postponed treatment until they are very ill.12 Once medical needs
can no longer be ignored, these individuals often seek medical care
under various safe-harbor laws such as 42 U.S.C. § 1395(d)-which
prevents hospitals from denying care to those in emergency need
merely because they lack insurance.' 3 As the old saying goes, there is
no such thing as a free lunch. The uncompensated costs of this care
7. Diane Rowland et al, Health Care & The Middle Class: More Costs & Less Coverage, The
Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation: Focus on Health Reform, p. 6 (2009), http://www.kff.org/
healthreform/upload/7951.pdf.
8. Jessica S. Banthin et al., Financial Burdens of Health Care, 2001-2004, 27 HEALTH Ave. 188,
188-95 (2008).
9. Ruth Helman et al., 2005 Health Confidence Survey: Cost & Quality Not Linked, 26 EBRI
NOTEs 1, 8 (2005), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/EBRINotes_11-2005.pdf.
10. EXEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT COUNCIL OF EcoN. ADVISORS, THE ECONOMIC CASE
FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM 12 (2009).
11. Michele Melden et al., Health-Care Rights of the Poor: An Introduction, 1 D.C. L. REV.
181, 189 (1992).
12. William P. Gunnar, The Fundamental Law That Shapes the United States Health Care Sys-
tem: Is Universal Health Care Realistic Within the Established Paradigm?, 15 ANNALS HEALTH L.
151, 155 (2006).
13. See Jack Hadley et al., Covering the Uninsured in 2008: Current Costs, Sources of Payment,
& Incremental Costs, 27 HEALTH AFF. w399, w407-11 (2008) (discussing the implications of in-
creasing coverage for the currently uninsured).
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are then shifted from the uninsured to the insured. 14 Thus, as the
number of uninsured Americans increases, so does the cost of health
insurance, as providers turn to the insured for recoupment of uncom-
pensated care.' 5 Additionally, employees who receive health insur-
ance as part of their benefits package pay the price of these increases
in decreased wages.16
Because nearly half of all health care in the United States is paid for
by federal, state, and local governments through Medicaid, Medicare,
and other programs,' 7 governments are particularly affected by rising
health care costs. In 1960, health care expenses constituted only 5.2%
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), or $36 per person.' 8 Since that
time, health care costs have consistently risen faster than GDP by an
average of 2.6%.19 According to the Centers for Medicare and Medi-
caid Services, health care spending is estimated to account for 18.9%
of GDP in 2018.20 To put this number into context, the government
expenditures for health care are expected to reach close to $13,100 per
citizen, for a total annual health care expenditure of $4.2 trillion,21 an
amount nearly five and one half times the $787 billion stimulus pack-
age of 2008.22 Without question, this spending creates an enormous
burden on our federal and state governments.
Taken together, these facts and projections paint a compelling pic-
ture of the serious challenges facing the American health care system.
It is common for opponents of the free market to argue that health
care is an area which the free market has clearly failed, thus exempli-
fying the need for a complete government takeover of health care.23
14. Jack Hadley & Judith Feder, Hospital Shifting & Care for the Uninsured, 4 HEALTH AFF.
67, 69 (1985), available at http:/content.healthaffairs.org/cgilreprint/4/3/67.pdf.
15. FAMILIES USA, HIDDEN HEALTH TAX: AMERICANS PAY A PREMIUM 1 (May 2009), avail-
able at http://www.familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/hidden-health-tax.pdf.
16. ARNOLD KLING, CRISIS OF ABUNDANCE: RETHINKING How WE PAY FOR HEALTH CARE
22 (2006).
17. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 10, at 11.
18. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., TABLE 1: NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDI-
TUREs AGGREGATE, PER CAPITA AMOUNTS, PERCENT DISTRIBUTION, & AVERAGE ANNUAL
PERCENT GROWTH, BY SOURCE OF FUNDS: SELECTED CALENDAR YEARS 1960-2008 (2008).
19. Michael E. Chernew, et al., Increased Spending On Health Care: How Much Can The
United States Afford?, 22 HEALTH AFF. 15, 16 (2003), available at http://content.healthaffairs.orgl
cgi/reprint/22/4/15.pdf.
20. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, NHE PROJECTIONS 2009-2019, FoRE-
CAST SUMMARY & SELECTED TABLES (2010).
21. Id.
22. See American Recovery & Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1604, 123 Stat.
115, 366 (2009).
23. Paul DeMarco, Universal health care: Private enterprise can't fix our ailing system, PHYSI-
CIANS FOR A NATIONAL HEALTH PROGRAM (May 20, 2009), http://www.pnhp.org/news/2009/
may/universal-health-care-private-enterprise-cant-fix-our-ailing-system.
[Vol. 8:305
2010] CAN You REALLY HAVE Too MUCH OF A GOOD THING?
On the other hand, supporters of free market principles often resist
such assertions on the ground that the market will eventually "fix"
health care.2 4 Surprisingly, both arguments are, in part, based in
truth, while, at the same time, partially incorrect.
A true free market economy relies on various assumptions operat-
ing simultaneously. For example, to operate efficiently, any given
market must operate under conditions such as perfect information,
many buyers and sellers, a uniform product, and freedom of entry and
exit.25 These conditions ensure that firms act as price takers, produc-
ing goods at the lowest possible cost in the long run and only earning
normal profits.26 However, if any one of these assumptions are re-
moved, the market cannot allocate resources efficiently. 27
As detailed below, United States tax policy has created significant
distortions in the health care market that have disconnected patients
from their role as cost-conscious buyers. Because of these distortions,
the health care market has been prevented from operating as a free
market in the conventional sense of the word and, if left unaddressed,
current tax policy will continue to facilitate dramatic increases in
health care costs, government spending, and decreased competitive-
ness of domestic enterprises.
A. History of a Tax Policy Distorting Incentives
At one time, the United States health care market operated like any
other market, with buyers and sellers interacting in a competitive en-
vironment. It was then common for patients to pay for a significant
portion of doctor bills, prescriptions, and hospital visits out-of-pocket,
with health insurance only covering a small portion of care.28 These
patients, like consumers in normally functioning markets, demanded
high quality services at the lowest price available. Since that time,
however, the American health care market has transitioned from this
relatively free and consumer-driven system to one where patients
have been ousted from their status as cost-conscious consumers and
have been replaced by third parties such as private insurance compa-
nies and governmental entities. 29
24. Newt Gingrich, The Market Can Fix the Health Care Problem, US NEWS & WORLD RE-
PORT (Jan. 27, 2009), http://politics.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2009/01/27/the-market-can-fix-
the-healthcare-problem.html.
25. MANKIW, supra note 6, at 290, 483.
26. Id. at 290.
27. Id. at 154.
28. HEALTH INS Ass'N OF AMERICA, SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH INSURANCE DATA 1994 2
(1995); THOMAS SOWELL, APPLIED ECONOMICS 53 (2009).
29. DR. DAVID GRATZER, THE CURE: How CAPITALISM CAN SAVE AMERICA 25-44 (2006).
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Specifically, in an effort to combat wartime price inflation, Presi-
dent Roosevelt enacted wartime price and wage controls within the
United States in the 1940s.30 As with any price and wage control,
shortages were destined to result.31 When wage controls led to
shortages of workers, employers sought to entice potential employees
in ways other than wages. As a result, employers began offering non-
cash benefits such as employer-provided health care insurance.32 A
byproduct of these actions was that, as employer-provided health in-
surance was not technically considered wages, employers sought to
pass these wage substitutes to employees tax free. While often at-
tacked by the IRS on the ground that these benefits constituted in-
come,33 Congress solidified the exclusion of employer-provided health
care from federal taxation by the enactment of Section 106 of the In-
ternal Revenue Code in 1954.34
The benefit of this tax expenditure is significant.35 By paying for
health care costs tax-free through an employer rather than out-of-
pocket, an employee can shelter a significant amount of income that
otherwise would be subject to taxation at an employee's marginal
rate.36 In other words, this subsidy reduces the overall cost of
purchasing health insurance by an amount equal to the taxpayer's
marginal tax rate. According to the Congressional Budget Office, the
result is an average reduction of health insurance costs by "about
[thirty] percent."37 Thus, employees, particularly those with high mar-
ginal tax rates, have an enormous incentive to demand a significant
amount of compensation in the form of nontaxable employer-pro-
vided health care benefits.38 It is not surprising then, that as of 2008,
30. Id. at 25; accord SUZANNE S. TAYLOR, NEGOTIATING HEALTH INSURANCE IN THE WORK-
PLACE 2 (1992).
31. MANKIW, supra note 6, at 114-15.
32. GRATZER, supra note 29, at 26-27.
33. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Bonwit, 87 F.2d 764, 766 (2d Cir. 1937); Canaday v. Guitteau, 86
F.2d 303, 305 (6th Cir. 1936); Yuengling v. Commissioner, 69 F.2d 971, 972 (3d Cir. 1934); Weeks
v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 248, 255-256 (1951); Hackett v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 1325, 1332
(1945), aff'd, 159 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1946); Brodie v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 275, 283 (1942);
Deupree v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 113, 121 (1942); Danforth v. Commissioner, 18 B.T.A. 1221,
1222 (1930); Adams v. Commissioner, 18 B.T.A. 381, 384 (1929).
34. See H.R. REP. No. 83-1337 at 138, reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4171.
35. "Tax expenditures" are generally defined as losses to the U.S. treasury that arise from
granting certain deductions, exemptions, or credits to specific categories of taxpayers. See also
PHILIP D. OLIVER, TAx POLICY: READINGS & MATERIALS 677 (2d ed. 2004).
36. GRATZER, supra note 29, at 25-27.
37. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, KEY ISSUES IN ANALYZING MAJOR HEALTH INSURANCE
PROPOSALS 5 (2008).
38. Accord SUZANNE S. TAYLOR, NEGOTIATING HEALTH INSURANCE IN THE WORKPLACE 21
(1992).
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nearly ninety percent of all privately-purchased health insurance was
paid for through employers.39
Moreover, the more health care costs that can be filtered through
this employer-provided health insurance, the larger the benefit to the
employee. 40 While the incentive to funnel more and more care
through employer-provided health insurance would not be quite so
significant if the exclusion was capped, Section 106 provides no maxi-
mum amount that can be shielded from income.41 Over time, the tax
exclusion for employer-provided health insurance has led employees
to demand increasingly inclusive forms of health insurance policies as
they seek to shift more and more after-tax out-of-pocket expenses to
tax-exempt employer-provided coverage. 42 Similarly, employers have
little incentive to limit the amount of compensation paid in the form
of health insurance, as they receive a corresponding deduction for the
full cost of purchasing such care just as they would a salary expense.43
The increased demand for extremely inclusive coverage cannot be
understated. American citizens have become very accustomed to hav-
ing someone else pay for health services.44 A recent survey conducted
by the Society for Human Resource Management found that employ-
ees value employer-provided health benefits more than compensa-
tion.45 In fact, studies have suggested that as many as eighty percent
of employed Americans with health coverage would prefer $6,700 in
employment-based health insurance coverage over an additional
$6,700 in taxable income, even if that coverage cost the employer
$10,000.46 Because of these employee preferences, an employer
would likely have difficulty retaining quality employees by not meet-
ing this demand. Accordingly, these policies have resulted in a signifi-
cant portion of wage income being redistributed in the form of health
39. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, INCOME, POVERTY, & HEALTH
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2008 (2009) (while only 66.7% of Americans are
covered by private insurance, 58.5% of those policies are employer-provided).
40. This is because the amount of any given tax deduction is subtracted from gross income
when the taxpayer computes his or her income taxes. As a result, the tax deduction will lower
overall taxable income and thus lower the amount of tax paid according to the taxpayer's margi-
nal rate. Accord GRATZER, supra note 29, at 26.
41. See 26 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
42. See PAUL J. FELDSTEIN, HEALTH CARE EcoNoMics 121-22 (1993). See also CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 37, at 5.
43. See 26 U.S.C. § 162(a)(1) (2006).
44. KLING, supra note 16, at 26.
45. Soc'y for Human Res. Mgmt., 2009 Employee Job Satisfaction: Understanding the Factors
that Make Work Gratifying (2009), http://www.shrm.org/Research/SurveyFindings/Articles/
Documents/09-0282_JobSatisSRFigures.pdf, (sixty-nine percent of employees rated health
benefits as "very important," while only fifty-one percent viewed income the same).
46. Helman, supra note 9, at 10.
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insurance and, thus, a corresponding increase of coverage within those
policies. In part because of these market distortions, the amount of
out-of-pocket expenses paid by American citizens has dropped to a
paltry twelve percent of all health care spending in 2008, down from
forty percent in 1970.47
In this way, one can argue that the wage controls enacted during the
1940s led to a tax policy that promotes the positive goal of promoting
health care by way of employer-provided health insurance. From this
perspective, the tax code "reduces public health care expenditures,
promotes greater efficiency and equity in the health care system, and
even furthers social justice." 48 Unfortunately, incentivizing health in-
surance in this way has resulted in significant adverse consequences
for the health care market.
Economists have chastised the tax exclusion for employer-provided
health insurance for "caus[ing] a substantial revenue loss, dis-
tribut[ing] these tax reductions very regressively, encourag[ing] an ex-
cessive purchase of insurance, distort[ing] the demand for health
services, and thus inflat[ing] the prices of these services." 49 There is
certainly merit to all of these critiques. For example, as of 2007, this
tax expenditure is estimated to cost the federal government nearly
$250 billion per year.50 Nevertheless, the remaining focus of this arti-
cle will center on the final critique, that the tax treatment of em-
ployer-provided health insurance has significantly contributed to the
rising prices of health care by transforming the united states health
care market from a bottom-up, consumer-driven system where the
market allocated resources according to consumer decisions between
quality and cost, to a top-down system where costs have become of
little concern to many patients.
47. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERvS., TABLE 6: PERSONAL HEALTH CARE Ex-
PENDITUREs AGGREGATE, PER CAPITA AMOUNTS, & PERCENT DISTRIBUTION, BY SOURCE OF
FUNDS: SELECTED CALENDAR YEARS 1970-2008 (2008) (eighty-six percent of all consumer
health care spending in the United States is paid for by a third party).
48. Bradley Joondeph, Tax Policy & Health Care Reform: Rethinking the Tax Treatment of
Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance, 1995 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1229, 1230 (1995).
49. Martin Feldstein & Elisabeth Allison, Tax Subsidies of Private Health Insurance: Distribu-
tion, Revenue Loss & Effects, in MARTIN FELDSTEIN, HOSPITAL COSTS AND HEALTH INSURANCE
216 (1974).
50. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, TAx EXPENDITURES FOR HEALTH CARE 2 (2008), http://
www.jct.gov/x-66-08.pdf; see also Thomas M. Selden & Bradley M. Gray, Tax Subsidies for Em-
ployer-Related Health Insurance: Estimates for 2006, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1568, 1568-1579 (2006),
available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgilreprint/25/6/1568.pdf.
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B. Economic Health of the Health Care Market
According to economic theory, efficiency - or Pareto optimality - is
achieved when it is impossible to make one person in society better
off without making society worse off as a whole.51 In other words, the
benefits to society have been maximized. Contrary to the belief of
some, however, the free market does not always achieve this effi-
ciency. Where Adam Smith's "invisible hand" does not guide society
to efficiency is typically referred to as a "market failure."52 For exam-
ple, market failure exists in the case of monopolies where a supplier
has no competition and can, thus, act as a price maker rather than a
price taker.53 This results in both higher prices and an underproduc-
tion of goods in society.5 4 Inefficiencies also exist in transactions that
create externalities, a resulting cost imposed on an independent third-
party.55 In this instance, because the parties to a transaction only take
into account their internal costs - not the total cost of the transaction
on society - the transacted good is overproduced. 56
Like these examples, the health insurance market is subject to sig-
nificant failures. This is because "third-party payments take away im-
portant incentives for efficiency." 57 However, before illustrating these
inefficiencies and their causes, it is first important to understand the
basic role and function of health insurance providers. Fundamentally,
insurance companies make money by an in-depth understanding of
the laws of large numbers.58 In any insurance policy, there is a cov-
ered event (loss), cause of loss (peril), and risk of loss from a particu-
lar peril (hazard).59 Generally, insurers offer protection from loss by
pooling the funds of a large number of buyers who share similarly
situated hazards. These funds are called "premiums," and losses in-
curred by individuals within that group of buyers will be paid for by
way of the collective premiums.60 By insuring a very large number of
buyers with similar hazards, the insurance company can estimate its
51. CLIFFORD WINSTON, GOVERNMENT FAILURE VERSUS MARKET FAILURE 2 (2006).
52. MANKIW, supra note 6, at 154.
53. Id. at 154, 321.
54. Id. at 320-21.
55. Id. at 154, 204.
56. Id. at 206.
57. KLING, supra note 16, at 45.
58. FREDERICK G. CRANE, INSURANCE PRINCIPLES & PRACICE 11 (1980).
59. Id. at 5.
60. Id. at 12-13.
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exposure to the perils and price the premiums so that it can set a pre-
mium that, over time, will exceed losses fairly well. 6 1
A key feature of insurable risks is that the "[liosses are acciden-
tal,"62 meaning unintended and unexpected by the insured. 63 For this
reason, most forms of insurance, such as homeowners and auto insur-
ance, are referred to as casualty insurance.M For instance, fire insur-
ance does not cover arson caused by the insured, nor does auto
insurance cover intentional damage to a vehicle caused by the in-
sured.65 The reason behind the need to cover only accidental losses
arises because insurance effectively reduces the perceived cost of any
given insured loss. By reducing that cost, consumers are more likely
to incur the covered loss because it comes at a perceived reduction in
cost. Accordingly, if an insured were to insure losses within the direct
control of the insured, the insured can - and will have increased incen-
tive to or, put another way, decreased incentive not to - incur losses to
obtain policy benefits. This situation, where a party engages in inap-
propriate, risky, or immoral behavior because they are not ultimately
liable for its consequences is referred to in the economic realm as the
problem of "moral hazard."66 Insurance companies must prevent
such actions or else they would be unable to remain in business. 67
In contrast to the typical insurance market, the rise of health insur-
ance attributed to the tax exclusion of employer-provided health in-
surance has created a market for insurance that departs from the
61. Id. at 29. To do this, however, insurance companies must estimate the level of risk, or
hazard, in any particular pool of similarly situated buyers accurately. If low-risk buyers are mis-
takenly sold insurance in a pool of high-risk buyers, the low-risk buyers will be overcharged
based upon their risk. Conversely, if high-risk buyers are pooled with low-risk buyers, the insur-
ance company will lose money as it will underestimate overall exposure to risk. Thus, insurance
differs from other commodities in that the price of the good-the insurance-depends on the
identity of the purchaser.
62. Id. at 12.
63. CRANE, supra note 58, at 21.
64. See id. at 24-25.
65. Id. at 21.
66. MANKIW, supra note 6, at 484; see also C.A. KULP & JOHN W. HALL, CASUALTY INSUR-
ANCE 12 (4th Ed. 1968)
67. CRANE, supra note 58, at 21, MANKIW, supra note 6, at 485 (Only covering accidental
losses does not completely remove the insured's ability to increase the probability of losses.
Because of the reduced cost of loss from insurance, the insured also has less incentive to safe-
guard against risk. For example, without insurance, a homeowner has an incentive to purchase
smoke alarms to warn of fire at an early stage so loss may be avoided. However, having fire
insurance may result in the homeowner purchasing too few fire smoke detectors. This is because
the perceived cost of a loss from fire has been decreased by the existence of fire insurance. To
the homeowner with insurance, the cost of purchasing smoke alarms may exceed the perceived
cost of an insured fire, though they would not exceed the cost of an uninsured fire. Put another
way, "the homeowner bears the cost of the [detector] while the insurance company receives
much of the benefit.").
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traditional accidental and unintentional structure that is fundamental
to the efficient functioning of the insurance industry. 68 A significant
portion of health care is discretionary. 69 As employees have re-
sponded to tax incentives by attempting to funnel more and more
health care costs through employer-provided health insurance, insur-
ance companies have been forced to respond by covering discretion-
ary services, those where the insured has control and discretion over
insured loss. As of 2008, private and public forms of health insurance
paid roughly eighty-six percent of all health care costs, up from fifty-
nine percent in 1970.70 In fact, citizens of the United States pay fewer
out-of-pocket health care expenses than almost every other industrial-
ized nation.71 Partly because of the tax incentive to funnel an increas-
ing amount of health care through health insurance, today's health
insurance policies now cover a wide array of non-accidental and inten-
tional health expenses such as purchase of contraceptives, hair resto-
ration, fertilization treatments, mammograms, maternity expenses,
smoking cessation treatments, child care, acupuncture, athletic train-
ers, midwives, massage therapy, and professional counseling, just to
name a few.7 2 For this reason, the problems associated with moral
hazard are particularly serious in the market for health insurance.73
68. KLING, supra note 16, at 51. In a normal insurance market, the problems of moral hazard
in health insurance would generally revolve around consumers choosing not to follow healthy
lifestyles, avoiding preventative check-ups, or engaging in risky behaviors such as smoking or
drinking because the costs of these actions will ultimately fall on the insurance company rather
than be paid by the insured.
69. KLING, supra note 16, at 15.
70. See CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 47.
71. See CHRIS L. PETERSON & RACHEL BURTON, COMPARISON WITH OTHER OECD CoUN-
TRIES 36 (2007), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34175 20070917.pdf
72. VICrORIA C. BUNCE & JP WIESKE, HEALTH INSURANCE MANDATES IN THE STATEs 2009
5-7 (2009), http://www.cahi.org/cahi-contents/resources/pdflHealthlnsuranceMandates2009.pdf
73. JAMES L. ATHEARN, RISK & INSURANCE 176 (1977) (noting that "moral hazard is much
greater in health insurance" than other forms of insurance because of the subjective nature of
the risk, the inability to distinguish between accidental losses and intentional losses, and diffi-
culty in defining insured events). For instance, an auto insurance policy that - in addition to
accidental coverage - covered acts within the insured's control, such as repairs and other mainte-
nance would allow the insured to cause a covered loss. Because the perceived cost of repair and
other maintenance have been reduced due to the existence of insurance, the consumer will de-
mand more of the covered services. In other words, the insured will have an increased incentive
to obtain oil changes or scheduled maintenance more frequently than it otherwise would in the
absence of insurance. In this case, the insured may choose to have its sixty-thousand mile service
at the fifty-thousand mark, whereas without insurance the policy holder may have postponed
service for an additional ten or fifteen-thousand miles. See also KLING, supra note 16, at 54
(noting that discretionary spending is not within the category of insurable risks and creates vast
incentive to over consume health care).
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By having significant control over many of the losses, insured pa-
tients have an increased incentive to demand the covered benefit.74
Conversely, because health insurance significantly reduces the pa-
tient's perceived cost of treatment, the consumer is unlikely to object
to increased costs and quantities of treatments and services.75 This,
combined with the fear of malpractice liability, may tempt doctors to
over-treat and over-prescribe medicines for their patients, because
they know the patient is unlikely to object to, or even inquire into, the
costs of the procedure. 76 Even the insurance industry advocate, the
National Association of Health Underwriters, acknowledges that
these problems "are present in all health insurance markets because
all traditional health insurance claims are paid by a third party."77 Ul-
timately, the reduced incentive to demand cost-effective care in a
third-party payment structure creates a significant overutilization of
health care. The extent of this overutilization is stunning. According
to some estimates, as much as "[f]orty percent of the elective proce-
dures are unnecessary."78 This problem is particularly troubling in ar-
eas of "premium medicine" such as high-cost diagnostic procedures
used to rule out minor symptoms. 79
In the only long-term experimental study of its kind, the RAND
Corporation studied nearly 8,000 individuals over an eleven-year pe-
riod to determine the effects of cost-sharing on utilization and
health.80 The individuals were assigned one of five health insurance
74. TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 19.
75. KLING, supra note 16, at 55.
76. John Cogan & Russ Roberts, Cogan on Improving the Health Care System, ECONTALK
(July 31, 2006) (noting that defensive medicine is significantly facilitated by the fact that doctors
know that the costs of treatment are covered by insurance and, thus, the patient is not likely to
object to unnecessary care), http://www.econtalk.orglarchives/2006/07/cogan-on-improv.html;
accord TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 19; KLING, supra note 16, at 36.
77. See NAT'L Ass'N OF HEALTH UNDERWRITERS, THE TAX CODE & HEALTH INSURANCE
COVERAGE: A DISCUSSION OF ISSUES RELATED TO CHANGING THE FEDERAL TAX EXCLUSION 6
(2009), http://www.nahu.org/legislative/financing/NAHU%20Tax%2OTreatment%20Whitepaper
June%2009%20FINAL%20(3).pdf, (noting that "health insurance premiums are directly tied
to the cost of medical care").
78. Jonathan Lapook, Uninformed Consent Costly For Patients? Americans May Be Driving
Up Medical Costs By Consenting To Unnecessary Medical Procedures (CBS Evening News
broadcast June 9, 2009), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/06/09leveningnews/
main5075694.shtml.
79. KLING, supra note 16, at 53.
80. RAND CORPORATION, THE HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT: RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS
1-2 (2006) [hereinafter THE HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT], available at http://www.rand.
org/pubs/research-briefs/2006/RANDRB9174.pdf.
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plans ranging from zero-deductible plans to high-deductible plans.8'
The experiment made several key findings. According to the results,
"participants who paid for a share of their health care used fewer
health services" than those who paid zero out-of-pocket expenses.82
Specifically, those insulated from all out-of-pocket costs sought nearly
twice as much care as those with a health insurance plan that covered
only five percent of the costs. 3 While some might view this finding as
common sense, it showed that reconnecting patients with the cost of
care could reduce overconsumption of health services and ultimately
reduce the cost of care. While estimates differ, recent studies suggest
that "the overall spread of health insurance between 1950 and 1990
may be able to explain half ... [of the increase in spending] over this
time period."8 4
It is important to note that reducing patients' health care utilization
by preventing cost-sharing between patients and third parties does not
necessarily result in a positive benefit if that reduction in demand also
leads to decreased health quality. What was most surprising about the
RAND study, however, was that the reduction in health care demand
by more closely aligning the patient with the costs of care "had no
adverse effects on participant's health."85 In other words, the more
health care that was paid through health insurance, the more a patient
used services that did not positively contribute to the patient's overall
health. This finding has lent support to many economists' assertions
that the incentives resulting from an increasingly inclusive health in-
surance market leads to overuse of health care services that provide
relatively few health benefits. As a result, the problem of moral haz-
ard results in a market that overproduces goods that-if given perfect
information-buyers would not purchase at current price levels in a
normally functioning market.
Finally, the patient's lackadaisical attitude in the midst of a third-
party payment system also permits hospitals and other medical prov-
iders to set prices above marginal costs or be productively inefficient,
given that the consumer lacks the incentive to reduce costs due to the
81. Id. at 2; see also EMMETr B. KEELER, EFFECTS OF COST SHARING ON THE USE OF MEDI-
CAL SERVICES & HEALTH, RAND Health 317-321 (1992), available at http://wwww.rand.org/
publications/RP/RP1114/.
82. THE HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT, supra note 80, at 1.
83. JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE ET AL., FREE FOR ALL? LESSONS FROM THE RAND HEALTH IN-
SURANCE EXPERIMENT, TABLE 4.17 (1993).
84. AMY FINKELSTEIN, THE AGGREGATE EFFECTS OF HEALTH INSURANCE: EVIDENCE FROM
THE INTRODUCTION OF MEDICARE 2 (2005) available at http://www. weblamp.princeton.edu/
-chw/papers/FinkelsteinMedicare OctoberO5.pdf; cf CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 37, at
21 (estimating increase in costs resulting from decrease in out-of-pocket costs at ten percent).
85. THE HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT, supra note 80, at 3.
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decrease in the perceived cost of health care.86 This argument can be
illustrated by recent studies on the cost of underlying medical care.
Since 1996, the average hospital markup has risen from eighty-five
percent above cost to about one hundred eighty-five percent above
cost in 2007.87 According to the Medicare Payment Advisory Com-
mission, because "few patients pay full charges, rapid charge growth
may have little impact" on consumer decision-making, as patients
have little incentive to demand cost-effective treatment when their
perceived cost is already extremely low.88 Consequently, by removing
the incentives of patients to question prices, or treatments, the current
health care market creates a non-competitive market where sellers
need not act as "price takers" and can instead act as "price makers."89
In sum, empirical studies suggest that insurance markets result in an
inherently inefficient allocation of resources. Unfortunately, tax poli-
cies aimed at encouraging health care have inadvertently led to the
rise of all-inclusive health insurance. This lack of "skin in the game,"
so to speak, has significantly increased the problem associated with
moral hazard by reducing incentives for consumers to demand cost-
effective treatment and increasing the incentive for consumers to
over-consume health care. The end result has been an explosion of
health care costs and widespread dissatisfaction of payers, providers,
and patients. 90
In the case of market failure, economists generally believe that gov-
ernment intervention can intervene to improve efficiency in some re-
spects.91 Government involvement, however, must be carefully
tailored so that it does not create more harm than good by imposing
costs on society that exceed the benefits to society from the govern-
ment action. Economists generally consider situations where govern-
ment intervention causes such a net loss on society as a "government
failure." 92
86. See EXEc. OFFIcE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 10, at 11 (noting increased prevalence of
insurance has reduced incentive of "enrollees for choosing physicians, hospitals, and diagnostic
testing facilities that are higher quality and lower cost").
87. MEDICARE PAYMENT & ADVISORY COMM'N, A DATA BOOK: HEALTH CARE SPENDING &
THE MEDICARE PROGRAM 90 (2009), available at http://www.medpac.gov/documents/Jun09
DataBookEntireReport.pdf
88. Id.
89. MANKIW, supra note 6, at 154.
90. GRATZER, supra note 29, at 4.
91. See MANKIw, supra note 6, at 490.
92. WINSTON, supra note 51, at 2-3. In other words, market failure is defined as the ineffi-
ciency that results from inherent problems with free market incentives. Government failure, on
the other hand, is defined as the inefficiency that results from government intervention that
imposes more costs on society than benefits.
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While often attributed to a failed market, a significant driver of
health care inefficiency has been created by Internal Revenue Code
policy gaffes. This is not to say that the increase in private health
insurance is the sole reason for increased costs in the American health
care market, but it is hard to deny that this policy has misaligned in-
centives and distorted the structure of the U.S. health care market in a
manner that encourages over-consumption and reduces incentives for
consumers to pressure providers to maintain competitive pricing. Ac-
cordingly, government failure can be, at least in part, attributed to the
abnormally rising costs of the health care market.
III. ADDRESSING INEFFICIENCIES IN HEALTH CARE
A. Congressional Response
In response to the rising costs of both health care and health insur-
ance, legislatures have spent the past year urging for reforms that are
expected to significantly impact the United States health care market.
It would seem that policy makers-in attacking rising health care
costs-would tend to at least discourage current market inefficiencies
by removing the tax incentive for employer-provided health insurance
relative to out-of-pocket health care payments. However, because
cost-shifting to third parties has become so entrenched in the minds of
the general public,93 policies seeking to remove tax benefits for em-
ployer-provided insurance would likely be open to attack on the
ground that such actions would reduce, not increase, accessibility to
care. Admittedly not a strong economic concern, the persuasiveness
of such an argument may pose a difficult political obstacle for legisla-
tures seeking meaningful reform.
On November 7, 2009, the House of Representatives passed the Af-
fordable Health Care for America Act 9 4 in an effort to combat the
drastically rising costs of health care. Less than two months later, the
Senate followed suit, passing the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (the "PPACA")95 on a highly publicized Christmas Eve
vote. Later, questions arose as to whether enough votes could be
93. See KLING, supra note 16, at 46.
94. Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. (2009), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=lllcong-bils&docid=f:h39 6 2eh.txt.
pdf.
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mustered to reconcile the House and Senate health reform bills.9 6 In
an effort to prevent the stagnation of reform, President Barack
Obama later outlined a separate proposal for health insurance re-
form.97 The President's proposal was designed to "bridge the gap be-
tween the House and Senate bills."98 Despite the very real concern
that the time for health reform had passed, the House of Representa-
tives passed, on March 21, 2010,99 the Senate health reform bill as
reconciled, which was signed into law two days later on March 23,
2010.100
According to the President, his goal with respect to health care re-
form has been to "provide more security and stability to those who
have health insurance[,]" "provide insurance for those who don't[,]"
and "slow the growth of health care costs for our families, our busi-
nesses, and our Government." 01 At present, it appears political con-
cerns may have proven significant, as the ultimate government
solution is poised to further insulate patients from the costs of care by
enacting tax policies that encourage increased consumption of health
insurance while simultaneously subsidizing a significant amount of
out-of-pocket expenses.
In a nutshell, as an effort to encourage health insurance coverage,
the PPACA will impose an individual mandate tax on citizens who fail
to obtain health insurance, with limited exceptions for low income in-
dividuals.' 02 This tax will be phased in over a period of years and will
ultimately be tied to a percentage of income.103 The PPACA will also
require employers to provide health insurance to employees or face
96. See Jeffrey Young, Public option to abortion: Key moments in Obama's struggle to pass
health bill, THE HILL (Mar. 27, 2010), http://thehill.com/homenews/house/89489-the-key-mo-
ments-in-obamas-struggle-to-pass-health-reform.
97. See Health Care Meeting Proposal, WHTEHOUSE.GOV (Feb. 22, 2010), http://www.
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/summary-presidents-proposal.pdf.
98. See id. at 1.
99. 156 Cong. Rec. D313-01 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2010).
100. See Remarks on Signing the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 2010 DAILY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 196 (Mar. 23, 2010), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2010/
DCPD-201000196.pdf.
101. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on Health Care Reform, 2009 DAILY
COMP. PREs. Doc. 693, 3 (Sept. 9, 2009), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2009/
DCPD-200900693.pdf.
102. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501(b), 124 Stat.
119, 244-46 (2010) (adding Chapter 48 to the Internal Revenue Code to provide tax penalties for
the failure of individuals to obtain coverage and an exception for individuals who cannot afford
coverage) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(a), (e)).
103. See id. §§ 1501(b), 10106(b)(2) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(c)).
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similar tax penalties, with certain exceptions.104 Because requiring in-
dividuals to purchase health insurance is quite difficult with so few
options for non-employment based purchases, the PPACA also cre-
ates health insurance exchanges through which individuals can
purchase coverage, with premium and cost-sharing credits available to
individuals and families with income up to four hundred percent of
the federal poverty level.10 5 Further, the PPACA will impose new reg-
ulations on health insurance plans such as banning certain risk-based
pricing, preventing denial of coverage based on medical status or pre-
existing conditions, and imposing guaranteed issue requirements. 106
Finally, to facilitate expansion to low-income taxpayers, the plans
would expand Medicaid coverage to one hundred thirty-three percent
of the federal poverty level.107
B. Analysis of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
Several competing objectives must be considered when discussing
health policy. On one hand, American health reform must address
the very real problem of accessibility to care. In addition, rising
costs-which have significantly contributed to the problem of de-
creased accessibility-must also be addressed. Finally, no health care
debate would be complete without acknowledging that the rise of very
inclusive forms of insurance has created a resistance by the American
people to any solution that creates greater out-of-pocket payments for
health care.
Certainly, reducing the number of individuals who cannot afford
health care is an important policy goal of advanced societies such as
the United States. Judged under this framework, it is difficult to say
that the health reform PPACA does not meet this goal. Under the
PPACA, companies offering health insurance coverage will be re-
quired to offer insurance to every individual who so desires cover-
104. See id. § 1513(a) (amending Chapter 43 of the Internal Revenue Code to provide tax
penalties for employers who fail to offer coverage to employees who receive tax credits for the
purchase of insurance on the individual market) (to be codified at 26 U.S.C.A. § 4980H(a)).
105. See id. § 1401(a) (providing refundable tax credits to families making up to four hundred
percent of the federal poverty line by adding Section 36B to Chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue
Code) (to be codified at 26 U.S.C.A. § 36B(a), (c)(1)(A)).
106. See id. § 1201(2)(A) (prohibiting preexisting conditions exclusions) (to be codified at 42
U.S.C.A. § 300gg-3(a)); § 1201(4) (prohibiting discriminatory premium rates and guaranteeing
that insurers accept every employer and individual who applies for coverage) (to be codified at
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300gg(a), 300gg-1(a)).
107. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2001(a)(1) (expanding Medicaid to
one hundred thirty-three percent of the federal poverty line) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1396(a)).
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age.108 This will promote access to health insurance for those who are
currently denied care due to various high-risk factors. Second, insur-
ance companies will be barred from pricing high-risk consumers out of
the insurance market, by prohibiting increased prices because of fac-
tors such as health status, medical condition, claims experience, re-
ceipt of health care, medical history, or genetic information.109 The
PPACA also limits the premium adjustments that can be made for va-
rious other factors, such as tobacco use (limited ratio of one and one-
half to one) and age (limited ratio of three to one).110
It is important to note that requiring insurance companies to offer
coverage, while simultaneously limiting their ability to adjust premi-
ums to reflect risk, brings about another inefficiency often thought to
be inherent in insurance markets called "adverse selection." Adverse
selection refers to the situation where high-risk individuals dispropor-
tionately purchase insurance because they anticipate the benefits re-
ceived under the policy will exceed their costs in premiums, while low-
risk individuals tend to stay out of insurance markets since they view
the costs of premiums as exceeding the benefits anticipated to be re-
ceived."' Thus, adverse selection leads to a situation where the pool
of insured individuals reflects that of a riskier-than-average consumer,
rather than the average consumer. Theoretically, a riskier-than-aver-
age consumer will incur more losses on average, and will thus be more
expensive from the insurer's perspective, than the average consumer.
In order to address this problem, most insurers incorporate a risk pre-
mium into the actual price of coverage. 112 Therefore, the price for any
given type of insurance is often adjusted to reflect that of a riskier-
than-average buyer. This increased price of insurance, unfortunately,
further perpetuates the problem of adverse selection by discouraging
more low-risk buyers from purchasing insurance.113 This market fail-
ure results in inefficiency to the extent the market under-produces
insurance.
To illustrate the increased significance of adverse selection under
the PPACA, consider that a low-risk individual, armed with the
knowledge that their premiums will not increase as their risk in-
creases, could simply stay out of the market until they need care.
108. See id. § 1513(a) (to be codified at 26 U.S.C.A. § 4980H(a)).
109. See id. § 1201(4) (prohibiting price discrimination based on health status and other condi-
tions) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-4(a)).
110. See id. § 1201(4) (limiting price discrimination based on various other factors) (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg(a)).
111. See MANKIW, supra note 6, at 486.
112. See EXEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 10, at 16-17.
113. See TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 54.
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Staying out of the market poses no significant problems for the indi-
vidual because the PPACA requires the insurance company to insure
them if, and when, the individual becomes sick and desires insurance.
The PPACA further prohibits the insurer from charging them higher
premiums because they are sick. Together, these regulations are akin
to allowing a person to purchase fire insurance after a fire and requir-
ing the insurance company to cover the loss. As a result, the health
insurance market could ultimately lead to very risky consumers enter-
ing the market while less risky consumers sit out until their risk is
increased.114 As economist Paul Krugman points out, alone these pol-
icies would result in a "death spiral" of costs. 1 5
One way often suggested to combat this failure is for a third party-
often the government-to require all consumers to enter the risk pool
by purchasing insurance." 6 Krugman agrees, noting the only way to
prevent the potential for adverse selection is to "keep healthy people
in the risk pool, which means requiring that people purchase insur-
ance." 117 When all consumers participate in the insurance market, the
risk exposure to insurance companies will then match the risk of the
average consumer. In this way, the typical pool of insured individuals
will not reflect a riskier-than-average consumer and insurers will not
need to adjust premiums to the same. In fact, this is exactly what
Congress and the President have done. The PPACA includes man-
dates that individuals obtain insurance coverage or face a tax penalty
that equals the greater of two percent of household income or $750
per year.118 Studies suggest that the PPACA will result in an increase
in the number of insured in the risk pool. According to the RAND
Corporation, the PPACA would add roughly 26 million people to the
risk pool by 2019, reducing the number of uninsured individuals by
fifty-six percent,119 from nearly 49 million down to 23 million.120
Although out-of-pocket expenses currently constitute only twelve
percent of health care spending, the PPACA further seeks to insulate
114. Mark V. Pauly, Avoiding Side Effects in Implementing Health Insurance Reform, 362
NEw ENG. J. MED. 671 (2010), available at http://www.nejm.org/doilpdf/10.1056/NEJMp09l2l8l.




118. See Patient Protection & Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010),
§ 1501. This mandate, however, contains exemptions for certain low-income individuals. See
also Krugman, supra note 115.
119. See ELIZABETH A. McGLYNN, RAND CORP., RB-9519, ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENT
OBAMA'S PROPOSAL FOR HEALTH REFORM 1 (2010), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/
research briefs/2010/RANDRB9519.pdf.
120. See id. at 2.
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consumers from costs by enacting extremely generous tax subsidies in
order to offset the premium costs of health care as well as reduce the
percentage of out-of-pocket costs insured individuals will pay.121
First, the PPACA provides refundable, and also advanceable, tax cred-
its to taxpayers with incomes up to four hundred percent of the fed-
eral poverty line so they can purchase insurance on the individual
market.122 For an individual or family with income of one hundred
thirty-four percent of the federal poverty line, the taxpayer will gener-
ally receive credits sufficient to cover any cost of a health insurance
plan with an eighty percent actuarial value to the extent the costs ex-
ceed 2.8% of the taxpayer's income.123 This amount of permissible
cost-sharing is reduced as income increases. An individual or family
with income at four hundred percent of the federal poverty line will
only receive a credit to the extent the cost of the health insurance plan
exceeds 9.8% of taxpayer's income.124
Second, to those with incomes that do not exceed four hundred per-
cent of the federal poverty line, the PPACA also limits the out-of-
pocket expenses that can be charged by policies purchased on the in-
dividual market. Those with incomes up to two hundred percent of
the federal poverty line will have sixty-six percent of out-of-pocket
costs offset by tax subsidies.125 Those with incomes between two hun-
dred and three hundred percent will receive a fifty percent offset on
out-of-pocket costs, and those with incomes between three hundred
and four hundred percent of the federal poverty line will receive an
offset of thirty-three percent of all out-of-pocket costs.12 6 These subsi-
dies will be provided directly to the insurance company in order to
decrease the insured individual's cost sharing. Together, these pre-
mium and cost-sharing credits are expected to further insulate many
Americans from health care expenses and, in turn, increase accessibil-
ity to care.
Despite these accomplishments, the PPACA falls short in one im-
portant respect. As economist Arnold Kling has pointed out, of the
three competing health care objectives (increased accessibility, de-
121. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1401(a) (to be codified at 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 36B(a)).
122. See id. § 1401(a) (setting the requirements and limits for tax refunds) (to be codified at 26
U.S.C.A. § 36B(a), (c)); § 1412(a)(1) (setting requirements for advance payments) (to be codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C.A. § 18082(a), (c)).
123. See id. § 1401(a) (to be codified at 26 U.S.C.A. § 36B(a)-(b)).
124. See id.
125. See id. § 1402(c)(1)(A)(i) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 18071(c)(1)(A)(i)).
126. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1402(c)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii) (to be codified
at 42 U.S.C.A. § 18071(c)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii)).
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creased costs, and increased insulation from those costs), health policy
can do no more than further two of these goals at the expense of the
other. In particular, "[w]e cannot have health care that is both acces-
sible and affordable while insulating consumers from the cost." 127
This dichotomy, however, is exactly what the PPACA seeks to ac-
complish. It seeks to increase accessibility and consumer insulation
from cost, while hoping the underlying costs remain stable or de-
crease. Unfortunately, increasing accessibility to health insurance
without focusing on the underlying health care costs is like putting a
band-aid on an amputated arm. Frankly, increasing current expendi-
tures to reduce consumer out-of-pocket payments for insurance sim-
ply will not reduce the real problem of the underlying costs of health
care. As some economists would say, the true problem with the
health care market is "the prices, stupid!"1 28 As Douglas Elmendorf,
Director of the Congressional Budget Office, has recently stated, cur-
rent health policy directed at increasing insulation from cost means
that the cost "curve is being raised." 129 A more in-depth examination
of the PPACA will make clear the reason for Mr. Elmendorf's damn-
ing observation.
First, despite the inclusion of an individual mandate, a significant
problem exists within the PPACA that may prevent it from eliminat-
ing, or even significantly reducing, costs associated with the problem
of adverse selection. Particularly, the effectiveness of the individual
mandate tax depends on whether the individual paying the tax per-
ceives the cost of the mandate to exceed the benefit received by sim-
ply sitting out of the market. The PPACA assumes that a $750 tax
liability is sufficient to make the cost of remaining uninsured greater
than the costs incurred by becoming insured. However, with average
policies under the non-group market expected to cost an average of
$5,800 for individuals as of 2016,130 it will be "less expensive for many
127. KLING, supra note 16, at 45.
128. Gerard Anderson et al., It's the Prices, Stupid: Why The United States Is So Different
From Other Countries, 22 HEALTH AFF. 89, 103 (2003), available at http://content.healthaffairs.
org/cgilreprint/22/3/89.pdf.
129. Lori Montgomery & Shailagh Murray, Lawmakers Warned About Health Costs: CBO
Chief Says Democrats' Proposals Lack Necessary Controls on Spending, WASH. POST, July 17,
2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/16/AR2009071602242.html
(quoting Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office).
130. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, AN ANALYSIS OF HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS UNDER THE
PATIENT PROTECTION & AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 6 (Nov. 30, 2009), available at http://cbo.gov/
ftpdocs/107xx/docl0781/11-30-Premiums.pdf. The CBO estimates "Bronze" plans, generally the
least inclusive policy that meets the requirements of the PPACA, will cost an average of $4,500
to $5,000 for individuals and $12,000 to $12,500 for families in 2016. Letter from Douglas W.
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people to choose to buy insurance only when needed."1 31 Massachu-
setts, a state that has recently adopted similar reforms, provides a
striking example of the adverse selection problems that arise when
guaranteed issue and risk-pricing limitations are instituted in conjunc-
tion with a weak individual mandate. Following reform, insurers be-
gan noticing that low-risk individuals were staying out of the market
until health services were absolutely necessary, thus leaving the risk
pool to reflect individuals with higher-than-average risk. To illustrate,
one Massachusetts insurer recently noted that between 2008 and 2009,
"about [forty percent] of the people who purchased individual insur-
ance . . . stayed covered . . . for less than [five] months. Even more
amazing, they incurred, on average, about $2,400 per person in
monthly medical expenses-roughly [six hundred percent] higher than
... expected."132
In fact, the already weak incentive individual mandate may end up
providing even less incentive for consumers purchase health insurance
than expected. According to the Joint Committee on Taxation:
The [individual mandate] penalty is assessed through the Code and
accounted for as an additional amount of Federal tax owed. How-
ever, it is not subject to the enforcement provisions of subtitle F of
Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Olympia J. Snowe, U.S. Senator (Jan. 11, 2010), availa-
ble at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/108xx/docl0884/01-11-Premiums forBronzePlan.pdf.
131. OLIVER WYMAN, INSURANCE REFORMS MUST INCLUDE A STRONG INDIVIDUAL MAN-
DATE & OTHER KEY PROVISIONS To ENSURE AFFORDABILITY 10 (2009), available at http://www.
bcbs.com/issues/uninsured/background/Oliver-Wyman-Report-Showing-Impact-of-Healthcare-
Reform-on-Premiums-pdf.pdf.
For example, suppose a low-risk single adult who earns $37,500 per year is deciding between
purchasing insurance or remaining uninsured. If this person anticipates the likelihood of the
following medical expenses - a one-tenth percent chance of incurring $100,000 in expenses, a
one percent chance of $10,000 in expenses, a ten percent chance of $1,000, and a fifty percent
chance of $500 - this individual's expected monetary value of medical care would equal $550 [In
other words, this individual would have an expected monetary value of annual medical need of
$550 (($100000*.001)+($10000*.01)+($1000+.10)+($500*.5)=$550)]. Thus, the individual would
expect to incur $1,300 out-of-pocket medical expenses per year ($550 in cost + $750 individual
mandate tax).
Assuming CBO premium estimates of $5,800 per policy, this person would be eligible for a
premium credit in the amount of $2,125. Accordingly, purchasing insurance would cost $3,675,
more than double the cost if the individual simply stayed out of the insurance market and paid
for all expenses out-of-pocket. In this situation, remaining uninsured may be the most cost-
effective solution for this individual.
Note, however, these figures were merely hypothetical numbers to illustrate rational decision
making of an insured. Although individuals often do not estimate their estimated monetary
value of risk in such detail, such decisions are made implicitly in a more informal manner. In
addition, this analysis does not attempt to account for the subjective value an individual receives
through shifting by purchasing insurance.
132. Charlie Barker, A Costly Wrinkle in the Merged Market, LETSTALKHEALTHCARE.ORG
(June 22, 2009, 5:09 PM), http://www.letstalkhealthcare.org/ma-health-reform/a-costly-wrinkle-
in-the-merged-market/.
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the Code. The use of liens and seizures otherwise authorized for col-
lection of taxes does not apply to the collection of this penalty. Non-
compliance with the personal responsibility requirement to have
health coverage is not subject to criminal or civil penalties under the
Code and interest does not accrue for failure to pay such assess-
ments in a timely manner.'33
Without the ability of the IRS to enforce the individual mandate by
criminal or civil penalty, levy, or even interest, taxpayers have little
incentive to even take the minimal cost of the mandate into account
when making health care purchasing decisions. For these reasons, it is
not surprising that the ability of the PPACA to combat the bill's very
real problem of adverse selection has been called into doubt.134 Esti-
mates suggest that this weak mandate "would translate into premium
increases of approximately $1,500 for single coverage and $3,300 for
family coverage in today's dollars." 35
Even if the combination of tax penalties for the uninsured and cor-
responding tax credits for the insured were sufficient to reduce the
problem of adverse selection, the PPACA has yet another significant
shortcoming. The PPACA will significantly increase health insurance
costs to low-risk individuals. To illustrate, eliminating or reducing
risk-based price adjustment for risk-factors such as age and health sta-
tus are designed to "reduce premiums for [high-risk] purchasers." 136
Unfortunately, these provisions merely shift costs to those who are of
lower risk. Accordingly, "[e]liminating medical underwriting, requir-
ing guaranteed issue and requiring minimum benefit packages" will
significantly increase premiums for younger and healthier people,
while reducing'premiums for the older and the less healthy. 3 7 Studies
133. JoINT COMM. OF TAXATION, JCX-18-10, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE
PROVISIONS OF THE "RECONCILIATON Acr OF 2010," As AMENDED, IN COMBINATION WITH
THE "PATIENT PROTECTION & AFFORDABLE CARE Acr" 33 (2009), available at http://www.jct.
gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=3673. Note, however, that several legal scholars have
since weighed to question the accuracy of the JCT report. According to some, the IRS would
merely be prohibited from levying the taxpayers assets or subjecting them to criminal penalty for
noncompliance. See Paul L. Caron, The IRS Has Sufficient Administrative Authority to Enforce
ObamaCare's Individual Mandate, TAXPROF BLOG (Mar. 30, 2010), http://taxprof.typepad.com/
taxprofblog/2010/03/the-irs-administrative.html.
134. See, e.g., THOMAS D. SNOOK & RONALD G. HARRIS, MILLIMAN, INC., ADVERSE SELEC-
TION AND THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE (2009), available at http://publications.milliman.com/re-
search/health-rr/pdfs/adverse-selection-individual-mandate.pdf; WYMAN, supra note 131, at 8-10.
135. Id. at 10.
136. Id. at 8.
137. Id. For instance, suppose Insurance Company insures A and B. As discussed previously,
insurance companies are in the business of paying out less in benefits than they receive in premi-
ums. A is a young adult with statistically a much lower risk than B, who is elderly. Based on
actuarial studies, Insurance Company determines it will need to charge A one hundred dollars
per month and B one thousand dollars per month to remain profitable. Thus, Insurance Com-
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suggest that the inability of the regulations to combat the problem of
adverse selection will result in premium increases for low-risk individ-
uals "greater than [fifty] percent for this cohort in most of the country
in the first year of reform." 38 The PPACA, then, creates a situation
where "[low-risk] members will bear a greater burden of subsidizing
premiums for [high-risk] members."139 Because of this shift in costs to
low-risk consumers, the problem of adverse selection is expected to be
further exacerbated in light of such a weak individual mandate.140
A third, more significant, problem with the PPACA is its effect on
moral hazard. As discussed previously, insurance coverage inherently
carries with it a moral hazard problem, one that has been worsened
due to unforeseen side-effects of past tax policies.141 Rather than seek
to reduce the prevalence and inclusiveness of insurance to levels
found in other casualty markets, however, the individual mandate tax
is in position to do the opposite. In fact, its sole effect is to increase,
rather than decrease, the prevalence of increasingly inclusive insur-
ance. As discussed above, the PPACA provides credits to offset a sig-
nificant amount of premium costs,142 decreases the amount of out-of-
pocket payments that can be charged to the consumer,143 and man-
dates significant levels of coverage for insurance plans offered through
health insurance exchanges.144 Not surprisingly, these provisions are
poised to further intensify the problem of moral hazard.
Indeed, nearly every economic study of the current health reform
plans have found that, while tax subsidies may result in lower out of
pocket costs to the consumer, the true costs of health care will in-
crease. According to the Office of the Actuary at the Centers for
pany needs to collect an aggregate of $13,200 per year. Now suppose that Insurance Company is
prohibited from adjusting prices beyond a ratio of three to one based on age. Insurance Com-
pany could leave A's premiums unchanged and cut B's premiums to three times A's, or $300.
This, however, would leave Insurance Company with only $4,800 in annual premiums. If its
actuarial analysis were correct and annual claims equaled $13,200 per year, Insurance Company
would have a loss of $8,400. These losses would soon leave Insurance Company out of business.
Accordingly, rather than reducing B's premiums in response to the PPACA's restriction on risk-
based pricing, Insurance Company would likely choose to decrease B's premium and increase
that of A to a point where Insurance Company charges B only three times the premium of A but
also collects the necessary $13,200. Under this scenario, A would end up paying premiums of
$275 per month and B would pay premiums of $825. Thus, B's premium has decreased by seven-
teen and one-half percent, while A's monthly premium has increased two hundred seventy-five
percent.
138. Id. at 8.
139. WYMAN, supra note 131, at 8.
140. Id. at 10-11.
141. See supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
142. H.R. 3590, § 1401.
143. Id. at § 1402.
144. See id. at §§ 1301, 1302.
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Medicare and Medicaid Services, the increased demand for medical
services due to a full-insurance requirement may lead to "price in-
creases, cost shifting, and/or changes in providers' willingness to treat
patients with low-reimbursement health coverage."1 45 According to
the RAND Corporation cost estimates, the current proposals are ex-
pected to further accelerate rising health care costs by 2.4% above
their current unsustainable levels.146 A recent Congressional Budget
Office report finds even greater cost increases, indicating that current
proposals could result in an increase of ten to thirteen percent above
the status quo.147 Moreover, a study conducted by consulting firm Ol-
iver Wyman suggests that "average annual medical claims in the re-
formed individual market five years after reform [will] be [fifty]
percent higher than" today's prices.148 These results certainly do not
depart from the experience of Massachusetts, a state that has seen an
explosion of premiums upon enactment of similar legislation.149
Currently, the United States spends more on health care than
nearly every other industrialized nation 50 and is in real danger of
reaching budget deficits of extraordinary proportions. 151 Even the
Congressional Budget Office acknowledges that these policies would
be "difficult to sustain over a long period of time." 152 Thus, it appears
that current proposals have sacrificed the primary goal of slowing the
rapidly rising cost of health care in favor of the paternalistic goal of
145. RICHARD FOSTER, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., ESTIMATED FINANCIAL
EFFECTS OF THE "AMERICA'S AFFORDABLE HEALTH CHOICES AcT OF 2009" (Oct. 21, 2009),
available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/ActuarialStudies/Downloads/HR3200_2009-10-21.pdf.
146. See McGLYNN, supra note 119, at 2.
147. Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director, Cong. Budget Office, to Evan Bayh, U.S.
Senator, in AN ANALYSIS OF HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION
AND AFFORDABLE CARE Acr, at 4 (Nov. 30, 2009), available at http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/107xx/
docl0781/11-30-Premiums.pdf.
148. WYMAN, supra note 131, at 2.
149. CATHY SCHOEN ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, PAYING THE PRICE: How HEALTH
INSURANCE PREMIUMS ARE EATING UP MIDDLE-CLASS INCOMES 8 (2009), available at http://
www.commonwealthfund.org/-/media/Files/Publications/Data%20Brief/2009/Aug/1313_Schoen
paying thepricedb-v3_resortedjtables.pdf (noting an increase of twenty-one to forty-six per-
cent above the national average); see also Kay Lazar, Bay State Health Insurance Premiums
Highest in Country, THE BOSTON GLOBE (Aug. 22, 2009), available at http://www.boston.com/
news/healthlarticles/2009/08/22/bay-statejhealth insurancepremiums.highestinscountry/.
150. See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WORLD HEALTH STATISTICS 108 (2009).
151. Heesum Wee, U.S. Standard of Living Unsustainable Without Drastic Action, Former Top
Govt. Accountant Says, YAHOO! FINANCE (Mar. 31, 2010), http://finance.yahoo.com/tech-ticker/
u.s.-standard-of-living-unsustainable-without-drastic-action-former-top-govt.-accountant-says-45
8329.html?tickers=Adji,Agspc,dia,spy,tlt,XJ,xlv&sec=topStories&pos=8&asset=&ccode=.
152. Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director, Cong. Budget Office, to Nancy Pelosi,
Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, in THE RECONCILIATION PROPOSAL, at 14 (Mar. 20,
2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11379/AmendReconProp.pdf.
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ensuring full health insurance coverage and cost insulation for its
citizens.
C. Alternative Solution
Health care reform based on the goal of full insurance, in its current
form, will never be efficient. Given the manipulation of the health
care market through tax incentives aimed at increasing employer-pro-
vided health insurance, there is little room left for Adam Smith's pro-
verbial invisible hand. However, this does not mean that the two oft-
competing goals of increasing accessibility and decreasing costs of care
cannot be harmonized by the market. Such a benevolent result is cer-
tainly possible if the goal of reducing out-of-pocket payments is re-
placed by the more important goal of reducing the true costs of care.
The first step in addressing the nation's health care crisis under this
framework requires the realization that the main problem affecting
the American health care system is the explosion of the underlying
costs of health care. 53 It is this increase in the cost of care, not neces-
sarily the costs of health insurance, that is the driving force behind the
lack of health care accessibility, strain on federal budgets, and de-
creased competitiveness of American businesses. As the President of
Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield in Wisconsin recently noted,
"[i]nsurance is [only] expensive because health care is expensive." 154
If the cost of health insurance is merely a proxy for the cost of
health care, why then would we seek reform by encouraging participa-
tion in a system that denies one out of every fourteen claims155 and
adds no real value to individual health care services? 156 Fortunately,
"health insurance" is not the same as "health care" and the former is
not necessary for the latter. By first addressing rising health care costs
and then, within that framework, addressing health care accessibility,
rather than health insurance accessibility, policy makers can both ad-
dress improving coverage for citizens while also removing the dis-
torted incentives that have resulted in dramatically rising health care
153. See NAT'L Ass'N OF HEALTH UNDERWRITERS, supra note 77, at 5 (noting that "health
insurance premiums are directly tied to the cost of medical care").
154. Guy Boulton, Insurers Alone Can't Be Blamed for Rates, Economists Say, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL (Mar. 13, 2010), available at http://www.jsonline.com/business/87601967.html.
155. Walencia Konrad, Fighting Denied Claims Requires Perseverance, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5.
2010, at B6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/06/health/06patient.html.
156. A dollar of expenses paid out-of-pocket will go further toward health care expenses than
a dollar paid in insurance premiums. This is because insurance acts as a middleman, roughly
twelve cents of every dollar received in premiums is used to cover administrative costs. See JEFF
LEMIEUX, AM. HEALTH INS. PLANS, PERSPECTIVE: ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS OF PRIVATE
HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS 1 (2005), available at http://www.ahipresearch.org/pdfs/Administra
tiveCosts_030705.pdf.
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costs - a result that proves impossible when the problem is ap-
proached from the other direction.
Congress's first step in repairing the broken health care system
must be the removal of government-created incentives that have
shifted the health care market from a normally functioning, patient-
driven market to one where the cost-conscious consumer has been
completely removed in favor of third-party payers. The premise of
this idea has been supported by the president's council of economic
advisors, who suggest that one of the main objectives to improving
both quality and cost of the american health care market is to
"[g]ive[ ] patients a greater role."157 Accomplishing this objective is
far from difficult. A significant step toward that goal could be accom-
plished by simply eliminating the original cause of the distortion, the
tax exclusion of employer-provided health insurance. Besides both in-
creasing wages158 and expanding federal tax revenues by roughly $250
billion per year,159 eliminating the exclusion for employer-provided
health insurance will remove the current incentive for employees to
reduce out-of-pocket payments by funneling more and more health
care costs through employer-provided health insurance. Conse-
quently, the choice between paying for health care through one's em-
ployer and simply paying out-of-pocket will be equalized.
With incentives for employer-provided health insurance relative to
out-of-pocket payments removed, many consumers are expected to
shift to lower-cost high-deductible plans that cover catastrophic cover-
age while paying for ordinary expenses such as preventative care out
of pocket.160 By paying more out-of-pocket expenses, overutilization
is expected to dramatically decrease and costs are expected to mini-
mize over time. Economists predict that a more consumer-driven
market will result in "better alignment of treatment strategies with
patient preferences and ... lower costs."' 6 Even the national associa-
tion of health underwriters agrees, stating that "[c]urbing excessive
utilization and claims can ... be achieved through expansion of con-
sumer-directed health insurance plans."162 Thus, by placing the role
of the cost-conscious consumer back in the hands of the patient rather
157. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 10, at 19.
158. Id. at 25.
159. JoINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 50, at 2; see also Thomas M. Selden & Bradley
M. Gray, Tax Subsidies for Employer-Related Health Insurance: Estimates for 2006, 25 HEALTH
AFF. 1568, 1568-1579 (2006), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/25/6/1568.
pdf.
160. See KLING, supra note 16, at 49.
161. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 10, at 19.
162. NAT'L Ass'N OF HEALTH UNDERWRITERS, supra note 77, at 7.
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than a third party, current cost increases are expected to level off or
decrease over time.163
Despite these economic arguments, there is also an equitable argu-
ment for eliminating the tax exclusion of employer-provided health
care costs. According to the principle of vertical equity, individuals
with more ability to pay should pay more tax than those with less abil-
ity.164 The exclusion for employer-provided health insurance blatantly
fails this equitable maxim. The value of a deduction is inevitably tied
to the taxpayer's marginal rate. Because the income tax is progres-
sive, the benefit of any given tax exclusion is greatest for those with
high incomes and high marginal tax rates. On the other hand, those
with low marginal tax rates receive a very small benefit from this ex-
clusion. In fact, using pre-tax dollars to save for health insurance is
not a benefit for the 36.3% of Americans who, as of 2008, did not owe
any income tax at the end of the year.165 Moreover, low-income tax-
payers are the least likely to be able to afford the rising costs of health
insurance. The tax exclusion, then, would provide relatively little ben-
efit to these households even if their marginal tax rate exceeded zero.
Ultimately, this exclusion is little more than a subsidy for the wealthy
who receive generous employer-provided health insurance, while
those most in need of assistance receive no comparable subsidy
through the exclusion.
Furthermore, under the principal of horizontal equity, individuals
situated in similar economic positions should shoulder similar tax bur-
dens.166 However, the tax exclusion for employer-provided health in-
surance fails under this measure of equity as well. At any given
income level, individuals with employer-provided health insurance
pay less tax than do individuals who do not receive this benefit. For
instance, taxpayers who are employed but purchase health insurance
individually receive no benefit from this tax exclusion. People whose
employers provide more expensive health insurance coverage also re-
ceive a greater benefit than people with less generous coverage. In
addition, people whose employers pay a larger share of their health
163. Because of the political obstacles to eliminating the exclusion for employer-provided
health care, some economist alternatively suggest simply providing a similar deduction for all
medical expenses, rather than the current exclusion for employer-provided care. See, e.g., Peter
Robinson, Basically an Optimist'-Still, WALL Sr. J., Mar. 26, 2010, available at http://online.wsj.
com/article/SB10001424052748704094104575144011906222520.html.
164. See OLIVER, supra note 35, at 88.
165. Scorr A. HODGE, TAX FOUNDATION, RECORD NUMBERS OF PEOPLE PAYING NO IN-
COME TAx; OVER 50 MILLION "NONPAYERS" INCLUDE FAMILIES MAKING OVER $50,000 7
(2010), available at http://www.taxfoundation.org/files/ff214.pdf.
166. See OLIVER, supra note 35, at 88.
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insurance premiums receive a greater benefit than people whose em-
ployers pay a smaller share. Clearly, this exclusion has resulted in tax-
payers with similarly situated incomes receiving disproportionate
benefits.
Opponents, however, may suggest that the transition to a consumer-
driven system will not reduce health care spending on the ground that
health care demand is completely inelastic. This means that health
spending and utilization will not be affected by increased cost-sharing
of patients. In other words, when people are sick, they are not very
price-sensitive. Generally, price elasticity may be measured by the ra-
tio between the percentage decrease of demand for a given good for
every percentage increase in price of any given good.167 Completely
inelastic demand will result in an elasticity of zero, while more elastic
goods may have an elasticity of -1 (elastic) or -2 (very elastic).
The argument that health care demand is completely inelastic since,
by nature, life and death depend on its consumption is contradicted by
empirical studies.168 Rather, studies show that consumers are sensi-
tive in varying degrees to price changes in medical care.169 While
studies vary in degree of elasticity, a working paper by amanda kowal-
ski claims that the elasticity of medical care is -0.23, which suggests
that demand for health care is extremely elastic.170 A more recent
study found, that for office visits, the estimated price elasticity is be-
tween -1.38 and -1.90 and, for pharmaceutical drugs, price elasticity is
between -0.20 and -1.4.171 These findings reject the notion that a more
consumer-driven health care market would not lead to a decreased
demand of unnecessary care and overutilization.
The idea that much of health care demand is elastic and that in-
creased price consciousness will reduce demand of unnecessary ser-
vices is further supported by several long-term studies. For example,
the rand health insurance experiment found that increasing coinsur-
ance rates led to decreasing utilization of unnecessary medical care.172
167. MANKIW, supra note 6, at 91.
168. As an aside, it is of note that life also depends on foods and shelter, but such need has
not prevented the market from controlling costs in those areas.
169. See, e.g., Borger et al., Projecting Long Term Medical Spending Growth, 27 J. HEALTH &
ECON. 69 (2008), available at http://www.mpsge.org/mainpage/MedicalSpending.pdf (surveying
past studies which show elasticity between -.04 to -1.5).
170. AMANDA E. KOWALSKI, NAT'L BUREAU OF EcoN. RESEARCH, CENSORED QUANTILE
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE ESTIMATES OF THE PRICE ELASTICITY or EXPENDITURE ON MEDI-
CAL CARE (2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl5085 (finding an elasticity of -2.3).
171. AMITABH CHANDRA ET AL., NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, PATIENT COST-SHAR-
ING, HOSPITALIZATION OFFSETS, & THE DESIGN OF OPTIMAL HEALTH INSURANCE FOR THE
ELDERLY (2007), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl2972.
172. THE HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT, supra note 80, at 2.
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More recently, a multi-year study of nearly 655,000 individuals con-
ducted by cigna found that medical costs were reduced by fourteen
percent when individuals had higher out-of-pocket payments, com-
pared to complimentary individuals enrolled in traditional health in-
surance plans. 73 Those with diabetes, joint disease, and hypertension
experienced the greatest cost reduction compared with traditional in-
surance, with cost decreases of fifteen percent, twenty-one percent,
and twenty-seven percent, respectively.174 Not only did costs decrease
but individuals enrolled in the high-deductible plans "were far more
likely to take advantage of preventive care visits than individuals en-
rolled in traditional plan."' 75 The increased risk-prevention lends sig-
nificant support for the argument that the moral hazard present in
low-deductible plans leads to decreased incentives for insured individ-
uals to act in a cost-conscious manner and to engage in risk-reducing
activities such as preventative care. Thus, evidence firmly rejects the
notion that price elasticity should prove a barrier to the effectiveness
of consumer-driven care.
Another argument against eliminating the exclusion for employer-
provided health insurance coverage is that it will increase adverse se-
lection problems. Some studies suggest a lack of adverse selection in
the U.S. health care market that can be partially attributed to the fact
that employer-provided health insurance may create artificial pools of
insured not based upon risk.'76 Thus, it is argued that continuing the
tax exclusion for employer-provided health insurance reduces market
inefficiencies by encouraging group coverage and, thus, discouraging
adverse selection. Nevertheless, the extent to which adverse selection
poses a problem has been the subject of debate. A number of studies
have shown at least some inefficiencies resulting from adverse selec-
tion,177 while others studies have shown the opposite. 78 Without a
173. CIGNA, CIGNA CHOICE FUND EXPERIENCE STUDY: SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 1
(2009), available at http://newsroom.cigna.com/images/56/1209 CIGNA%2OChoiceFundStudy.
pdf.
174. Id. at 2.
175. Id.
176. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 37, at 5, 8; JAYANTA BHATACHARYA & WIL-
LIAM B. VOoT, EMPLOYMENT & ADVERSE SELECTION IN HEALTH INSURANCE 37-38 (2006),
available at http://rwjf-eriu.org/pdf/wpl7.pdf; NAT'L Ass'N OF HEALTH UNDERWRITERS, supra
note 77, at 2; KLING, supra note 16, at 20.
177. See DAVID CUTLER, ET AL., AM. ECON. REV., PREFERENCE HETEROGENEITY AND IN-
SURANCE MARKETS: EXPLAINING A PUZZLE OF INSURANCE 157 (2008), available at http://
dash.harvard.edulbitstream/handle/1/2640581/cutler-preference.pdf~sequence=2 (finding ad-
verse selection significant in some form of markets, such as annuity markets).
178. See, e.g., Susan Ettner, Adverse selection and the Purchase of Medigap Insurance by the
Elderly, 16 J. OF HEALTH ECON. 543, 559 (1997) (finding adverse selection not to be a significant
factor in the purchase of medigap insurance); see also LIRAN EINAV ET. AL., BEYOND TESTING:
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consensus on the effects of adverse selection in the health care market
should the tax exclusion for employer-provided insurance be elimi-
nated, it is difficult to say whether these costs outweigh the benefit of
reducing the problems of moral hazard. Accordingly, this argument
poses little threat to the effectiveness of a shift to a more consumer-
driven health care market.
As consumers are placed back in control and costs decrease to more
sustainable levels, many citizens will find medical care affordable, and
accordingly, the problems of accessibility will be reduced indirectly.
Nevertheless, while eliminating the tax exclusion for employer-based
insurance coverage may result in decreased costs over time, by itself it
does nothing immediately to address the country's need to ensure ac-
cessibility to care during that transition. Fortunately, increasing acces-
sibility is simpler than one might think. To meet this objective,
Congress need only expand current entitlement programs to cover
those who cannot afford coverage during the transition, with a few
caveats.
Congress should merge Medicare and Medicaid into one single enti-
tlement program. This program should be used to cover only those
who cannot afford access to care. With an estimated fourteen percent
of Medicare beneficiaries having annual incomes that exceed $50,000,
a significant amount of expenditures would likely be saved as those
who are able to afford health care are forced out of government subsi-
dized care.179 Accordingly, enrollment should be based solely on in-
come and, for those over seventy, some alternative measure of wealth
could be used since a steady stream of annual income is likely less
applicable. The savings resulting from a completely means-tested
health entitlement program, combined with the projected annual in-
crease of $250 billion in federal tax revenue realized by eliminating
the exclusion for employer-provided insurance, 180 could then be used
to expand the income base of the program to cover many of the
Americans who cannot currently afford health care but whose in-
comes or ages prevent them from qualifying for federal subsidy pro-
grams such as Medicaid or Medicare.
It is important to note that a significant problem with Medicare and
Medicaid is that they are also plagued by the problem of moral haz-
EMPIRICAL MODELS OF INSURANCE MARKETS 313 (2009), available at http://www.stanford.edul
-leinavlpubs/AR2010.pdf (noting the "lack convincing evidence on whether selection would ex-
ist in the private market"); KLING, supra note 16, at 20.
179. JILL BERNSTEIN, SHOULD HIGHER INCOME BENEFICIARIES PAY MORE FOR MEDICARE?
NAT'L ACAD. OF SOC. INS., 5 (1999), available at http://www.nasi.org/usr-doc/medicare-brief_2.
pdf.
180. JorNr COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 50, at 2.
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ard, as they operate as a third-party payer in much the same manner
as private insurance.' 8" To alleviate this problem, the merged entitle-
ment program could be structured in a way that places program bene-
ficiaries in a more consumer-driven role. Specifically, the entitlement
program should be more akin to a food stamp system than an insur-
ance system, with the federal government providing health care
vouchers to beneficiaries on the basis of eligibility.18 2 These vouchers
would cover only a specified set of medical procedures as determined
by an independent medical advisory board established by the govern-
ment.18 3 To reduce the problem of moral hazard, a method of encour-
aging smart consumption and use of these vouchers could then be
introduced. Any unused vouchers for a given year would be carried
over to subsequent years so long as the recipient continued to meet
income qualifications. Moreover, the unused vouchers would have a
cash redeemable value, meaning that any unused vouchers could be
redeemed at the end of the year for a much smaller amount of money
- say somewhere between twenty cents and thirty cents per dollar.
This structure recognizes that beneficiaries have differing prefer-
ences for health care and health insurance. Some beneficiaries cer-
tainly pose more of a health risk than others, some are more risk
averse than others, and all will likely have differing desires with re-
spect to the spending of their personal medical care. Because benefi-
ciaries could use these vouchers according to their personal
preferences, health care provided under this structure would be inher-
ently more efficient as beneficiary utility could be maximized through
individual choice. In addition, this structure would operate as a de
facto cost-sharing system because an individual would have to weigh
the cost of giving up the voucher's redeemable cash value each time a
purchasing decision was made.
Within this framework, Congress can set an annual budget for this
revised entitlement program, tying subsequent increases in said
181. See, e.g., Mark Pauly, Medicare Drug Coverage & Moral Hazard, 23 HEALTH AFF. 113,
113-14 (2004), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/23/1/113.pdf.
182. Accord Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Victor R. Fuchs, Health Care Vouchers - A Proposal for
Universal Coverage, 351 NEw ENG. J. MED 1255, 1256-57 (2005), available at http://www.robert-
h-frank.com/PDFs/Emanuel-Fuchs.NEJM.3-24-05.pdf (advocating a similar voucher system, but
ones that would apply regardless of need); EZEKIEL J. EMANUEL, & VIcTOR R. FucHs, THE
HAMILTON PROJEcr, A COMPREHENSIVE CURE: UNIVERSAL HEALTH CARE VOUCHERS 7-11
(2007), available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/07useconomics.eman
uel/200707emanueljfuchs.pdf.
183. Note, the Emanuel plan would limit the use of vouchers to purchase insurance. Because
of the moral hazard problem with all-inclusive insurance, this proposal would not likely provide
significant benefit in attacking the problem of third party payments. EMANUEL, supra note 182,
at 7.
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budget to the Consumer Price Index or GDP growth. Vouchers would
then be distributed based upon this budget and projected need. Those
with higher incomes would naturally receive fewer vouchers and, thus,
would be forced to share more of the costs of care with the govern-
ment. While the problem of moral hazard will remain in any system
where goods are paid for by third parties, by implementing a cost-
sharing mechanism in the voucher system, this problem can be at least
partially reduced.
A significant problem exists, however, in a voucher system for those
who are faced with higher than average health expenses in any given
year. In particular, those facing catastrophic illness would be without
much needed care to the extent that their costs exceed the quantity of
vouchers allocated. For this reason, the current Medicaid payment
model could remain in place to act as catastrophic coverage for certain
low-income beneficiaries. This would ensure that low-income individ-
uals could pay for common health care expenses with rationed vouch-
ers, while the Medicaid structure would provide a safety net for illness
or other ailments that qualify as catastrophic. All-in-all, the elimina-
tion of current tax exclusions and the restructuring of federal entitle-
ment programs in this way would result in a structure in which most
individuals would pay for health care out-of-pocket, very sick individ-
uals would have care covered by catastrophic insurance policies, and
the poor and elderly would have care provided by a government enti-
tlement program that would be built around significant internal cost
control mechanisms.
IV. CONCLUSION
Currently, millions of Americans do not have adequate access to
health insurance. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
seeks to increase accessibility by requiring insurance coverage of citi-
zens, removing barriers to obtaining that coverage, and increasing en-
titlements to ensure affordable premiums for low- and middle-income
families. Nevertheless, this system is unsustainable, as it ignores the
fundamental concept of scarcity of resources. The reason for the cur-
rent lack of access lies squarely within the dramatically increasing
costs of the underlying health care. While many may view govern-
ment subsidies as limitless, the money used to fund subsidies to
purchase health insurance does not come from thin air. If the rising
costs underlying these policies are not addressed, the taxes needed to
fund these new entitlement programs will eventually bankrupt the
federal government. Thus, in order to promote access in a sustainable
manner, the drivers of those underlying costs must be addressed.
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Congress should reexamine its current health care policy with the
goal of reducing, rather than increasing, the incentives for consumers
to purchase all-inclusive health insurance. First, Congress should
amend Section 106 of the Internal Revenue Code and eliminate the
current tax exclusion for employer-provided health insurance. Over
time, this should result in a deceased demand for unnecessary care
and reduced health care costs without sacrificing health outcomes.
While waiting for these results, Congress should also seek to merge
Medicare and Medicaid into a system that exists to provide cata-
strophic care coverage to low-income citizens while supplying medical
care vouchers for all other medical needs. Ultimately, this system will
ensure access to care for all citizens while imposing significant cost
controls within its structure. In this way, Congress could refocus re-
form policies to a more sustainable solution, by focusing on decreased
costs and increased accessibility rather than sacrificing long-term costs
for short-term insulation from out-of-pocket expenses.
